

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6031
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 00618

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

SECSTATE FOR SECRETARY AND PETER TARNOFF ONLY

WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESIDENT AND BRZEZINSKI ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, SO, US, MASS
SUBJ: THIRD MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SIAD

REFS: A) STATE 073540; B) STATE 072239

1. I HAD A LONG MEETING THIS MORNING WITH SIAD BARRE IN WHICH I INFORMED HIM THAT WE COULD NOT DELETE THE PHRASE "EXISTING INTERNATIONALLY-RECOGNIZED TERRITORY" FROM OUR LETTER. I GAVE HIM OUR REASONING, DRAWING ON POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL A, SUPPLEMENTED BY SOME LOCAL INSPIRATION. HE FIRST SAID THAT HE WAS "ALMOST CERTAIN" THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT APPROVE, BUT AT THE END HE SAID THAT HE WAS "NOT CERTAIN" THAT THEY WOULD APPROVE.

2. AS I WAS IN THE MIDST OF DICTATING THIS TELEGRAM, AMBASSADOR ADDOU SHOWED UP AT THE EMBASSY WITH AN URGENT MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT SIAD. SIAD ASKS THAT WE DELETE THE WORD "EXISTING" FROM THE PHRASE "THE EXISTING INTERNATIONALLY-RECOGNIZED TERRITORY OF THE SOMALI

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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC." ADDOU, WHO APPARENTLY WAS NOT SHOWN THE LETTER AND SEEMS TO BE UNAWARE OF ITS EXISTENCE, EXPLAINED THAT SIAD BELIEVES THAT THIS CHANGE WILL MAKE HIS SALES JOB TO THE COUNCIL EASIER AND ARGUES, I THINK RIGHTLY, THAT THE CHANGE IS NOT SUBSTANTIVE.

3. AFTER A LENGTHY BACK AND FORTH, HE REQUESTED THAT I POSE FOUR REQUESTS TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND ASKED THAT WE REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE WILL WAIT UNTIL WE HAVE A RESPONSE BEFORE HE SUMMONS THE COUNCIL. HE EXPLAINED THAT A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO HIS REQUEST WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS HAND IN DEALING WITH THE COUNCIL. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD FORWARD HIS REQUEST AND ENDEAVOR TO OBTAIN AS MUCH OF A RESPONSE AS I COULD BY 8 P.M. LOCAL. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY INSTRUCTIONS, I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD REMAIN HERE UNTIL THE COUNCIL HAD ACTED. THIS PROMISES TO BE A LENGTHY SESSION OF THE COUNCIL AND THEREFORE I DOUBT THAT I WILL BE ABLE TO LEAVE HERE BEFORE TOMORROW MORNING AT THE EARLIEST. I WILL HAVE TO SEE HIM AS SOON AS I GET THE REQUEST AND THEN PROBABLY HAVE ANOTHER SESSION WITH HIM AFTER THE COUNCIL HAS COMPLETED ITS DELIBERATIONS.

4. THE FOLLOWING ARE PRESIDENT SIAD'S REQUESTS OF THE PRESIDENT:

A. "TAKE OFF THE EMBARGO ON ARMAMENTS, BY SALE OR GIFTS, TO SOMALIA BY OTHER WESTERN POWERS OR COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO THE US". WE THINK SIAD MEANS ASSUMING SOMALIA ACCEPTS OUR LETTER WILL THE US APPROVE THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS OF US ARMS TO SOMALIA AND WISH TO DISCOURAGE TRANSFERS OF NON-US ORIGIN ARMS?

B. WOULD THE PRESIDENT WHILE IN NIGERIA, AND OTHERWISE,
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BUILD SUPPORT AMONG OAU MEMBERS FOR OPPOSITION TO SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA? FURTHER, WOULD WE ENCOURAGE NIGERIA (CHAIRMAN OF THE GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE) AND OTHER MEMBERS WITH WHOM THE US HAS INFLUENCE (HE MENTIONED LIBERIA) TO SEEK A "JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION TO THE ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA PROBLEM?"

C. PROVIDE SOMALIA, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, WITH SUFFICIENT DEFENSIVE WEAPONS BEFORE ANY PUBLICITY IS MADE ON OUR AGREEMENT.

D. WOULD THE US REAFFIRM "ITS PREVIOUS DECLARATION THAT THE SOMALIA BORDERS WILL BE DEFENDED IF THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS INVADE AND TAKE A CLEAR-CUT STAND AGAINST SOVIET AND CUBAN COLONIALISM AND EXPANSION?

5. SIAD EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS NOT EMPHASIZING HELP FOR HIS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS NOW, "NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE SMALL, BUT BECAUSE WHAT ONE THINKS OF FIRST IS FREEDOM, HIS LIFE."

6. I IMMEDIATELY EXPLAINED TO SIAD THAT HIS THIRD REQUEST WOULD BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. SUCH MATTERS, I TOLD HIM, ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO KEEP

QUIET IN VIEW OF THE COMPLEX ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY AND OUR OBLIGATION TO INFORM CONGRESS OF A DETERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY AND TO PROVIDE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS. I ALSO POINTED OUT TO SIAD THAT THE RAPID PROVISION OF MILITARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT MIGHT BE BEST ACCOMPLISHED BY THIRD COUNTRIES INVOLVING EITHER MATERIEL OF NON-U.S. ORIGIN OR, CONCEIVABLY, U.S.-ORIGIN EQUIPMENT.

7. SIAD THEN ASKED ME, WITH REFERENCE TO HIS FOURTH REQUEST, WHAT WE WERE PREPARED TO PROVIDE IF THE AGREEMENT WERE SIGNED. I THEN DREW ON REF B, PARA 4, FOLLOWING ITS TEXT QUITE CLOSELY. HE DID NOT SEEM IMPRESSED.

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8. SIAD NEXT ASKED HOW SOMALIA COULD BE EXPECTED TO PAY FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT AS IT MIGHT RECEIVE, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THEY HAD NO MONEY. I REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FAVORABLE LOAN TERMS AND TO MY INTENTION TO GO TO SAUDI ARABIA AT THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTION. I URGED HIM TO MAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH TO THE SAUDIS. I ALSO REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE FUNDS AVAILABLE AND ASKED WHETHER ANY OF THAT MONEY WAS LEFT. HE SAID IT HAD ALL BEEN EXPENDED.

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WHITE HOUSE NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 0618

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

SECSTATE FOR SECRETARY AND PETER TARNOFF ONLY

WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESIDENT AND BRZEZINSKI ONLY

9. WE RETURNED THEN TO THE QUESTION OF SOMALIA'S SPECIFIC NEEDS. I POINTED OUT THAT COMPATIBILITY AND THE NEED FOR TRAINING INEVITABLY POSED PROBLEMS WITH SOMALIA'S USE OF U.S. EQUIPMENT. SIAD SAID THAT THIS IS NOT A REAL PROBLEM, EXPECT PERHAPS WITH ELECTRONICS GEAR. HE SAID SOMALIA ALREADY HAS QUITE A LOT OF U.S. EQUIPMENT WHICH HAD BEEN CAPTURED FROM THE ETHIOPIANS OR PURCHASED AS "CONTRABAND" THE LATTER WITH A SMILE. IN THE FORMER CATEGORY, HE SPECIFICALLY CITED M-48 TANKS AND RECOILLES WEAPONS. WE HAVE LEARNED HOW TO USE AND REPAIR THESE THINGS VERY QUICKLY, HE SAID.

10. THE ITEMS FOR WHICH SIAD CITES THE GREATEST NEED ARE ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE 106 MM RECOILLESS, REFLES, MACHINE GUNS, MOTORS AND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE EITHER AIRCRAFT OR TANKS. HE ASKED WHY NO TANKS. NOT WANTING TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF "OFFENSIVE" WEAPONS AT THIS RATHER DIFFICULT POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, I
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EXPLAINED THAT TANKS ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY IN OUR OWN INVENTORY AND THAT THE LEAD TIME IS AS MUCH AS 48 MONTHS. HE SCOFFED AT THIS EXPLANATION. I ALSO SUGGESTED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES MIGHT BE IN BETTER POSITION TO PROVIDE TANKS THAN THE U.S., AND HE SAID THAT GERMANY COULD DO SO PROVIDED THAT IT HAD U.S. AUTHORIZATION. HE ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE RELUCTANT ABOUT SUCH MATTERS.

11. SIAD WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WE WOULD ASK OF HIM IN RETURN. I SAID THAT ACCEPTANCE OF OUR FORMULA IN THE LETTER WAS ONE REQUEST AND I REMINDED HIM OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES AND STATEMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE SOMALI LIBERATION FRONTS AND THE DELICACY OF THE SITUATION WITH KENYA. THE MENTION OF KENYA PROVOKED A TWENTY-MINUTE MONOLOGUE IN WHICH HE AGAIN RECITED THE LONG STRING OF EFFORTS WHICH HE SAYS HE HAS MADE OVER THE YEARS TO ALLAY KENYAN CONCERNS. THESE INCLUDED COUNTLESS UNRECIPROCATED VISITS BY SOMALI OFFICIALS TO KENYA, HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH JOMO KENYATTA, HIS INVITATIONS TO KENYATTA'S SON AND DAUGHTER, "BANQUETS", AT WHICH HE HAD BROUGHT TOGETHER LEADERS OF THE SOMALI PEOPLE IN THE NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT AND KENYAN

DISTRICT COMMISSIONERS, HIS OFFER TO HAVE KENYATTA BECOME PRESIDENT OF A FEDERATION BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA, AND HIS INCARCERATION OF SOMALIS WHO HAD WANTED TO MAKE TROUBLE WITH KENYA. "PRESIDENT CARTER HAS MY BLESSING," HE SAID, HE CAN ASSURE THESE PEOPLE THAT "NOTHING WILL HAPPEN TO THEM FROM US."

FOLLOWING ARE MY THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS ON REPLIES TO THESE FOUR QUESTIONS. I URGE THAT THE ANSWERS BE PHRASED SIMPLY AND DIRECTLY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT SIAD WILL REVIEW THEM PERSONALLY.
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A) WE SHOULD INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO APPROVE THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS OF US ARMS AS ONE DEVICE TO ENSURE THAT WE WILL MEET HIS NEEDS IN A TIMELY FASHION. ON NON-US ORIGIN ARMS, WE SHOULD ALSO BE POSITIVE AND STATE THAT WE WOULD NO LONGER DISCOURAGE SUCH TRANSFERS. BY THE WAY, SIAD IS VERY AWARE OF OUR PAST EFFORTS TO DISCOURAGE THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS FROM SUPPLYING EQUIPMENT WHILE THE SOMALIS WERE IN THE OGADEN. I DO BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO RESTATE THAT WE WOULD ALLOW US ORIGIN TRANSFERS ONLY FOR SELF-DEFENSE PURPOSES AS STATED IN OUR LAW. FOR NON-US ORIGIN ITEMS, WE SHOULD SAY THAT WE WOULD ENCOURAGE SUPPLIERS TO ATTACH THE SAME SELF-DEFENSE CONDITION.

B) I THINK OUR ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE REITERATION OF THE FACT THAT, AS HE KNOWS, WE HAVE BEEN URGING A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THESE PROBLEMS FOR A LONG TIME, HAVE CONDEMNED SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO, BUT WE CANNOT COMMIT THE PRESIDENT TO SPECIFIC INITIATIVES WHICH APPEAR TO REFLECT SPECIAL SOMALI INTERPRETATION OF THESE PROBLEMS.

C) THIS ANSWER THOUGH NEGATIVE SHOULD BE CAST IN TERMS OF AN EXPLANATION OF THE BASIC EXPLANATION OF REQUIREMENTS OF OUR LAW WHICH DO NOT PERMIT SECRET TRANSFERS OF THE TYPE HE SUGGESTS. WE MIGHT SAY THAT WE WILL ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE.

D) ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT USG HAS NEVER DECLARED THAT SOMALI BORDERS WOULD BE DEFENDED, I BELIEVE SIAD'S QUESTION MAY ALLUDE TO PARA 2(D) OF STATE 49635 IN WHICH US EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO OFFSET SOVIET THREATS OR ACTIONS DIRECTED AT ASSISTANCE MEASURES PROVIDED TO SOMALIA BY REGIONAL STATES IN THE EVENT OF AN ETHIOPIAN INVASION. AS DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL, THIS DECISION WAS CONVEYED TO IRAN AND EGYPT, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE FN GOVERNMENTS CONVEYED AS MUCH TO GSDR. OR, SIAD'S STATEMENT MAY BE HIS INTERPRETATION OF SECRETARY'S POSITION IN PRESS CONFERENCE OF FEB 10 IN WHICH HE SAID THAT "WE WILL CONTINUE OUR PRESENT COURSE
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OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO NOT SUPPLYING ARMS TO EITHER SIDE. LET ME SAY THAT IF THERE IS A (ETHIOPIA) CROSSING OF BORDERS, THAT WOULD PRESENT A NEW AND DIFFERENT SITUATION AND WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER IT AT THAT TIME". (STATE 36187) WE COULD RESPOND BY TELLING SIAD THAT WE HAVE AT NO TIME AGREED TO "DEFEND" SOMALIA'S BORDERS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE MADE OUR POSITION ON TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY CLEAR AND WILL STATE THAT ANY INVASION ACROSS BORDERS IN THE REGION WOULD BE OTHERS IN THE REGION AND THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY, AND WOULD CAUSE US TO CONSIDER APPROPRIATE RESPONSES DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF SOMALIA.

12. I THINK THAT SIAD IS NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE INCLUSION OF OUR LANGUAGE, MINUS "EXISTING". WHILE SIAD'S TACTICS ARE REMINISCENT OF A SOMALI BAZAR, AS I HAVE NOTED BEFORE I DO BELIEVE THAT HE HAS DOMESTIC CONCERNS TO WORRY ABOUT. I HAVE EXPECTED SOMETHING LIKE THE NEW REQUESTS ALL ALONG. HERETOFORE HE HAS CAREFULLY REFRAINED FROM ASKING ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT COROLLARY POLITICAL SUPPORT OR THE SPECIFICS OF ASSISTANCE PACKAGES. WE HAD TO GET DOWN TO THE LATTER AT SOME POINT. WAITING UNTIL THE END TO DO THIS MAY HAVE BEEN IN PART TACTICAL, BUT I THINK HE HAD TO SEE CLEARLY WHAT OUR REQUIREMENTS WERE BEFORE HE GOT INTO DETAILS. HAVING SEEMINGLY CROSSED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THRESHOLD OF ENTERING INTO A RELATIONSHIP WITH US (DURING THE LATTER PART OF TODAY'S MARATHON HE DROPPED THE CONDITIONAL), BUT NOT BEING WHOLLY CONFIDENT OF THE COUNCIL'S REACTION, HE WANTS TO KNOW WHAT HE WILL GET OUT OF IT AND HOW IT MAY HELP HIM IN HIS PRESENTATION TO THE COUNCIL. TO THOSE WHO WILL BE IRRITATED BY THE APPARENT RELUCTANCE OF THE SOMALIS TO BE HELPED, I CAN ONLY SAY THAT IN MY EXPERIENCE THEY ARE UNIQUE IN THEIR PRIDE, SUSPICION, AND THEIR PASSIONATE ATTACHMENT TO THEIR LOST BROTHERS. WE SEE THE SOMALIS AS HAVING NO PLACE ELSE

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TO GO BUT THEY APPARENTLY DON'T THINK IN SUCH "EITHER-OR" TERMS. WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT, AS HAS OFTEN BEEN THE CASE IN OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS, WE AS WELL AS THEY HAVE SOMETHING AT STAKE HERE. FINALLY, IF YOU LOOK AT WHAT WE ARE ABLE TO SELL REPEAT SELL THE SOMALIS IT IS NOT MUCH. TRUE, THE FACT OF THE AGREEMENT HAS POLITICAL VALUE TO THEM; BUT IT ALSO CARRIES WITH IT RISKS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS THE RISK OF COUNTING ON MUCH AND RECEIVING LITTLE. IF THEY ONLY KNEW AS MUCH AS WE DO ABOUT HOW COMPLICATED THIS IS GOING TO BE, THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL OBSTACLES, THEY WOULD REALLY BE WORRIED. LET'S HOPE THEY DON'T TALK TO THE

CHADIANS.

13. I THINK THAT WE SHOULD ANSWER THESE REQUESTS PATIENTLY
BUT CAREFULLY. CERTAINLY WE MUST NOW ALLOW OURSELVES TO
BE DRAWN OUT, OR IN, TOO FAR. SPEAKING THE LANGUAGE OF
THE BAZAAR, I THINK WE ARE AT OUR "FINAL PRICE", IN THIS
PHASE OF THE BARGAINING.

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